



FIVE YEARS OF PROGRESS OR STAGNATION



An Assessment of the Government's Performance and Commitment to their Manifesto Promises for 2018 – 2023.



Tendai Murisa Rebekah Cross
Matron Muchena Sharon Murisa



Contents

01	Introduction
04	Context and Background
07	Methodology
10	Findings: How did the Government Perform?
13	Agriculture and Rural Development
17	Economy
22	Trade and International Relations
25	Governance, Politics and Civil Rights
29	Local Governance
31	Youth and Gender
33	Social Services
36	Corruption
38	Conclusion
40	Lessons Learnt- Six Take-aways
43	References

List of Tables

02	Summary of Promises made in each Sector
08	Scoring Method
12	Government Performance by Sector
16	Government Performance in the Agriculture and Rural Development Cluster
18	Government Performance in the Agriculture and Rural Development Cluster
20	New Mining Investments
24	Government Performance in Trade and International Relations
27	Timeline of Job Sikhala's Troubles with the Law
28	Government Performance in Governance, Politics and Civil Rights
30	Government Performance: Local Governance
32	Government Performance in Youth and Gender
34	Government Performance: Social Services
35	SMART Promises for Social Services
37	Government Performance: Eradication of Corruption

List of Figures

02	Overall Summary of Progress Made on the Promises
14	Maize, Tobacco, Wheat, Cotton, and Soybeans production trends
21	2017-2022 GDP
23	Trends in selected horticulture exports

List of Textboxes

19	Dams Construction 2018-2023
28	Job Sikhala case overview

1 Introduction

In the period just before the 2018 elections, the ruling party ZANU-PF presented to the electorate its campaign manifesto entitled “Unite, Fight Corruption, Develop, Re-engage, Create Jobs”. In the manifesto, the party made two hundred and thirty-four (234) promises which we organised around eight (8) clusters. The zimcitizenswatch.org project has been tracking the progress towards the implementation of the same promises since the inauguration of the president. To date the government has made progress on one hundred and eighty-seven (187) promises, completed sixteen, (16) and broke seven (7). In this report, we provide an analysis of the government's performance from August 2018 to the 5th of July 2023. We have in the past produced annual performance reports in [2020](#) and [2022](#). The present report builds upon the previous iterations. Whilst the platform has capabilities to track performance on an ongoing basis- the results always seem unfair to the government when presented as

a statement of progress before the actual term has been completed. The analysis presented in this report is focused on understanding the progress made by the government in implementing the promises that were made. It is also important to note that the analysis presented here is mostly based on tracking what the ruling party committed itself to doing and thus may not necessarily cover other concerns that citizens might have regarding the performance of their government. As already reiterated in previous reports the successful implementation of the manifesto does not necessarily lead to positive change across all sectors. It is rather an assessment of the party's sincerity to commit to an agenda they promised the electorate. There are many other intervening factors that determine the success or failure of a government. Table 1 and Figure 1 below provide a summary of the promises made by the government in each sector and the progress made to date in terms of implementing the promise.

TABLE 1 Summary of Promises made in each Sector

Issue	No. of Promises Made	Progress Made				
		Kept	Fully Completed (Implemented)	Modified	Broken	Not Commenced
Economy	113	97	7	1	2	6
Agriculture	32	25	3	0	1	3
Social Services	42	30	1	0	3	8
Trade and International Relations	14	13	1	0	0	0
Local Governance	2	2	0	0	0	0
Youth and Gender	16	11	2	0	0	3
Governance Politics and Civil Rights	11	8	2	0	1	0
Corruption	4	3	0	0	0	1
Total	234	189	16	1	7	21




FIGURE 1 Overall Summary of Progress Made on the Promises

Immediately after the military-assisted transition, we realised that Zimbabwe could be on the brink of some significant and dramatic change beyond having a new leader in office. The government's charm offensive was very loud and clear; here was a not-so-new suitor pretending to be new and promising us citizens a new Zimbabwe. Social media platforms and the general mainstream media were initially not sure of what was happening, and debates, which were at times highly polarised, were the order of the day. One of the most important questions was, 'How can we trust these guys when they were part of a government that has presided over the collapse of the country?' Many expert opinion pieces were written to enhance the new leader as a better pair of hands around the economy, but others also sought to remind us of the past

violence and how the new president was actively involved in those sordid affairs. We were back to gridlock. It was at this stage that we felt the need for a more objective and critical analysis of the not-so-new government in terms of what it was committing itself to, the actions it was taking, and issues it was neglecting, with the intention to ensure that there is an honest public discussion on progress or lack thereof.

The report is divided into four sections. First, we provide a broader contextual analysis of policymaking in the past five years. Then we discuss the methodology behind the tracker. We discuss the performance of the government using the themes in the tracker. We have added short stories about performance in certain areas to enhance the monitoring discussion by casting a spotlight on best and bad practices alike.

2 Context and Background

A discussion of the context of when the current government took over initially through a military-assisted transition in November 2017 and was then elected in 2018 is necessary here. Zimbabwe has since the turn of the century been in a multi-dimensional crisis characterised by isolation from international financial circuits, economic meltdown, runaway inflation, policy inconsistencies, and poorly managed land redistribution exercise which led to the collapse of production and also of the agribusiness sector that supported agriculture. Furthermore, the period was associated with several attempts to close or constrain freedoms for other political actors. Important development agendas were at times designed and implemented in a populist manner to the extent that there was no consensus on the need to fix colonially established land ownership patterns. Other scholars

saw fast-track land reform as nothing but a gimmick to win votes. Similar concerns were raised around the indigenisation agenda. The active participation of ZANU-PF-aligned elites as beneficiaries of these programs further led to concerns that these initiatives were part of grand corruption as David Moore (2004) called it 'primitive accumulation.'

The focus within the ruling party shifted soon after the 2013 elections. The ruling party found itself in the middle of a brutal succession battle which led to the ouster of many senior politicians. At that time many, (including The Economist), agreed that Zimbabwe's challenge was more economic than political. The task of restoring economic stability was captured very well by the Economist magazine, just before the 2018 elections where they observed that,

Whoever wins faces a huge task in putting back together a country shattered by a corrupt tyrant and his cronies, including Mr Mnangagwa. Once the breadbasket of southern Africa, this year up to 2.5m of Zimbabwe's citizens may need food parcels from international aid agencies. Five million Zimbabweans have emigrated over the past two decades or so. In many cases, their remittances are the main source of income for the families that have remained. The economy is smaller than it was two decades ago and just 6% of the working-age population is in formal work. There is a severe liquidity crisis as a result of a lack of hard currency. The government is again effectively printing money to pay for a corrupt state which it cannot afford.

(Economist Magazine, July 30, 2018).

The crisis is not a figment of our imagination; in his inaugural address, President Mnangagwa acknowledged the urgent socio-economic and political challenges that the country faced and committed to 'hit the ground running' in terms of the execution of his assignment of turning Zimbabwe around.

The current government is probably one amongst many that present difficulties when it comes to characterising their nature. On the one hand, the government has successfully sought to build or modernise infrastructure at a rapid pace. There

are undisputed positive indicators of growth ranging from record production levels of important crops such as maize, tobacco and wheat in consecutive years. However, the rapid infrastructure modernisation has arguably not necessarily led to equitable growth but instead yielded increasing levels of poverty and inequality, without any source of external funding. Could it be that the growth model is flawed? Furthermore, the current government seems to be bent on stifling political and civil freedoms. It took advantage of COVID-19-related measures to ensure that there are no incidences of protest. Prior to COVID-19, the government

had used live ammunition in response to violent protests that were occurring in Harare and Bulawayo.

It even tried a populist route. However, the public romance between citizens and the state was short-lived. There were already murmurings of dissatisfaction by the end of the President's first 100 days in office, in March 2018. Before long, we were

back to our original settings. The government had reacted with force to protests over delays in announcing election results in August 2018. These actions stifled attempts at international re-engagement and possibly the process of rebranding. The government may have neglected and underrated the need to implement and foster ways of sustainable international collaborations.

3 Methodology

Each year, the actions captured on the ZimCitizensWatch (ZCW) platform are used to calculate the barometer score which is a measure of two phenomena; the pace at which the government is implementing the promises it made during the elections and the comprehensiveness of the measures being adopted. It uses a very elaborate scoring (described in Table 2). We allocate a score for each indicator. The lowest score a productive action can receive is 2 which equates to 14% progress, as the action involves a change to the current way of doing things (either an incentive or a dis-enabler). A perfect score of 14 suggests that the adopted measure is most likely to comprehensively resolve the problems behind the promise. Should any actions be taken that break the specific promise, then that action is scored as zero. If there

have been multiple actions that have been undertaken or implemented against a single promise, we calculate an average score for all the related actions by dividing the total scores for the actions by the total number of actions. We have done this to avoid the danger of giving the impression that the government has implemented multiple actions, yet the actions are only aimed at addressing one promise.

Each promise is then classified under a specific sector, which is then averaged to give us a Sector Barometer Score. This score represents the percentage of progress taken towards fulfilling the promises identified in that thematic area. This final score is shaped by the status of promises as broken and non-commenced promises will score lower, while implemented promises will score above 80%.

TABLE 2 Scoring Method

Action	New Strategy	Yes=1 no=0
	Policy Reform (+) Incentive or Policy Reform (-) Dis-enabler	Yes=2 no=0
	Does it fit in an existing Legal Framework? Or has a new law been established?	Yes=1 no=0
	Has budget implications. New resources have been allocated	Yes=1 no=0
	Fits within an existing ministry	Yes=1 no=0
	Cross-ministry/agency collaboration established	Yes=1 no=0
	Time-frame-fits within the current annual planning cycle	Yes=2 no=0
	Is it a fully implemented policy?	Yes=5 no=0
	Barometer Action Score	Total out of 14




metro peech
WHOLESALEERS & brownie
Distributor of
CAPRI

4 Findings: How did the Government Perform?

THE QUICK READ

The government's average performance score was

56%



74%

Substantial progress was made in the Agriculture and Rural Development sector since 2018. This made the best-performing cluster with the highest completion rate of promises made.



42%

The worst-performing cluster was social services

The government achieved an average 56% performance score. Agriculture and Rural Development (74%) was the best-performing cluster followed by local governance (63%). The worst-performing clusters were social services (42%) and eradicating corruption (44%). Unfortunately, the incredible work done by the government in response to COVID-19 (social services) has been diluted by some of the intractable problems in the health sector and the lack of adequate government response to grievances such as poor conditions of service for medical practitioners. Despite the brave promises to eradicate corruption, existing allegations suggest that the scourge could have worsened during the period under review. Meanwhile, there are some scores that may seem confusing, for instance, the above half score for governance, politics and civil rights and local governance. The bar was always low. It is important to remember that we are discussing performance based on the commitments that the ruling party made in their manifesto. In this instance, the government made 11 promises to address issues of governance, politics and civil rights and they carried out 137 actions to fulfil these promises. Some of the actions implemented to date are:

- Commencement of implementation of the Commission of Inquiry into 2018 post-election violence report recommendations.
- Zimbabwe began the task of implementing the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence

Report Recommendations through the modernisation of 30 laws enacted during the Mugabe era, to meet Western Standards.

- On 22 May 2019, Zimbabwe ratified the ILO Protocol on Forced Labour, as part of ongoing attempts to combat forced labour in all its forms.
- The Constitutional Court banned the use of State security agents as public prosecutors at civilian courts, saying their secondment to the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) was a serious violation of the Constitution.

Furthermore, the government only made two promises towards improving local governance. These are:

- Re-alignment of the service provision standards in all areas that include water reticulation, electricity, roads, and other support infrastructure.
- Zero tolerance for corruption and incompetence in urban councils.

To date, the government has carried out sixty-six (66) actions to address issues of local governance. These include but are not limited to:

- Implementing the constitutional provision for devolution by developing the policy for the same.
- Disbursement of devolution funds.
- Revival of the Urban Development Corporation (UDCORP) Board.
- Upgrading water and sanitation

through borehole schemes, new water treatment plants and piped water systems.

- Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC), engaging

all council leadership and signing agreements of commitment to end graft within stipulated timeframes.

- ZACC red flagging Non-Compliant Councils.

TABLE 3 Government Performance by Sector

Scores classify: A: 80-100% B: 70-79% C: 60-69% D: 50-59% Fail: Below 50%

Sector	# promises	# actions	% not-commenced	% implemented	% in progress	Barometer Score	
Agriculture & Rural Development	32	236	9%	9%	78%	74%	B
Economy	113	614	5%	6%	85%	56%	D
Governance, Politics & Civil Rights	11	137	0%	18%	72%	58%	D
Local Governance	2	66	0%	0%	100%	63%	C
Youth & Gender	16	50	19%	12%	69%	55%	D
Trade & International Relations	14	123	0%	7%	93%	56%	D
Social Services	42	247	19%	2%	71%	42%	F
Corruption	4	94	25%	0%	75%	44%	F
Total	235	1567	12%	6%	81%	56%	D

The sections that follow provide a more detailed discussion of the performance of the government across the 8 sectors listed in Table 3.

How Government performed

1. Agriculture and Rural Development



74%

The Agriculture and Rural Development sector is a significant contributor to the country's economic performance. The fast-track land reform implemented at the turn of the century contributed to a radical shift in land ownership patterns. The sector was, prior to land reform, dominated by large-scale commercial agriculture and was the second largest source of employment and contributor to GDP. However, the fast-track land reform led to a significant drop or collapse in certain agricultural value chains. By 2017 some sub-sectors in agriculture such as tobacco and maize had begun to show signs of recovery. To date, agricultural production has recovered across many sectors. Independent evidence sourced from the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) demonstrates the improvements in production.




FIGURE 2 Maize, Tobacco, Wheat, Cotton, and Soybeans production trends


MAIZE




TOBACCO




COTTON LINT



WHEAT



SOYA BEANS



Source: FAO Statistics

Substantial progress has been made in the sector since 2018. There is a 74% completion rate of promises made. However, the government has not yet embarked on implementing five (16%) of the promises. The outstanding promises are,

- Establishment of growth points and rural service centres in order to create jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities.
- Proper planning for growth points and rural service centres across all provinces to facilitate the issuance of title deeds as well as access to utilities.
- Promote institutions for certification of organic agricultural produce.

The government introduced the [Pfumvudza/Intwasa¹](#) program as part of a number of measures aimed at enhancing smallholder farmers' production. The improvements in the delivery of inputs through the Presidential Inputs Scheme contributed towards improved production levels. Production figures have been increasing each year. Production figures for maize, wheat, and tobacco have surpassed previous records each year (see Figure 2). Tobacco yields hit a record in the 2022/2023 season. An estimated 260 million kgs were delivered at the auction floors and an estimated US \$407 million worth of tobacco has been exported in the first four months (Zimpapers, June 14 2023) ([The Herald](#)). In the previous year (another good one)

farmers delivered 182 million kgs at the auction floors and earned an estimated US \$650 million by the end of the marketing season (Zimpapers, 2022) ([Sunday News](#)).

The government introduced the [Presidential Rural Development Scheme programme](#) as part of its attempts to achieve the promise – 'Provision of support services in resettlement areas, including schools, hospitals, boreholes and extension services'. The Presidential Rural Development Scheme was designed to drill and deliver a total of 35 000 boreholes by 2025. It was argued that this would lead to agricultural development in the rural areas, to manifest rural industrialisation. The scheme targets,

- drilling and equipping solar-powered boreholes,
- equipping of drip irrigation infrastructure,
- seed financing for cash crops
- construction of horticulture gardens,

Since its inception, the scheme achieved the following:

- A total of [1020 boreholes](#) (2.9% of target) have been drilled across the 8 rural provinces in the country,
- 15 solar -powered horticulture gardens have been established,
- 112 boreholes have been equipped with bush pumps.

1 A conservation agriculture scheme adopted by Government to boost yields for communal and smallholder farmers who do not have access to irrigation. The scheme was adopted in light of erratic rains the country has been receiving over the past few years.



Table 4 provides the scoring of government performance under the Agriculture and Rural Development sector.

TABLE 4 Government Performance in the Agriculture and Rural Development Cluster

Sector	Subsector	# promises	# actions	Barometer Score
Agriculture & Rural Development	Land and Agrarian Reform	9	46	74%
	Rural Development	5	29	54%
	Agriculture & Agribusiness	18	161	80%
Total		32	236	74%

How Government performed

2. Economy



56%

As already stated, Zimbabwe has been grappling with a multi-faceted socio-economic crisis since the turn of the century. Current attempts at resolving the economic dimension of the crisis can be understood through the number of policy measures (at times contradictory) that the government has put in place since 2018. The measures include the Transition Stabilisation Plan (TSP 2018 – 2020). Through the TSP the government introduced the 2% intermediated money transfer tax (IMMT) on transactions. It curbed government borrowing and reduced the government's wage bill. In June 2019 the government renamed the Real Time Gross Settlement Dollar (RTGS) to the Zimbabwe Dollar (ZWL) and

banned the use of foreign currencies in order to end a multicurrency system. However, the multi-currency system – in particular the use of the USD as legal tender- was reinstated in March 2020. The setting of the official exchange rate for the ZWL to USD is based on the weekly auction managed by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, but there continues to be a parallel market rate which is often higher than the official rate. In 2023 alone, the Zimbabwe dollar “lost more than 40% of its value on the official market.” ([Bloomberg, April 2023](#)). In May/June of this year, the Zimbabwean dollar significantly depreciated in value. In addition, the challenge of cash shortages continues.

TABLE 5 Government Performance in the Agriculture and Rural Development Cluster

sector	subsector	# promises	# actions	Barometer Score
Economy	Budget Accountability	5	54	65%
	Economic Model (focus on State Owned Enterprises SOE)	4	18	61%
	Employment	8	48	41%
	Financial Services	10	30	36%
	Informal Sector	3	9	36%
	Investment Model	12	51	61%
	Mining	12	40	58%
	SMEs	13	37	57%
	Infrastructure	24	241	60%
	Tourism	10	43	66%
	Manufacturing	12	43	54%
Total		113	614	56%

The Government has pursued an infrastructure modernisation drive over the last 5 years. Significant initiatives include but are not limited to (i) upgrading the Beitbridge Border Post (the first phase has been completed), the expansion of the

Robert Gabriel Mugabe International Airport (completed) and rehabilitation of major roads like the Beitbridge-Harare highway and the completion of and resuscitation of major dam projects see Text Box 1 below.

Before 1980

Kariba Dam	Ncema Dam
Lake Mutirikwi	Suri Suri Dam
Lake Manyame	Ngondoma Dam
Manjirenji Dam	Siya Dam
Lake Chivero	Ruti Dam
Mayfair Dam	Inyankuni Dam
Sebakwe Dam	Palawan Dam
Bangala Dam	Antelope Dam
Mzinganwe Dam	Tiyabenzi Dam
Ncema Upper Dam	Mananda Dam
Mushandike Dam	Makado Ranch Dam
Mazowe Dam	Eben Dam
Gwenero Dam	Harava Dam
Ngezi Dam	Pampoenpoort Dam
Silalbhwa Dam	Odzani Dam
Claw Dam	

1980 - 2017

Tokwe Mukosi Dam	Manyuchi Dam
Osborne Dam	Amapongokwe Dam
Mazvikadei Dam	Muting Dam

20178- 2023

Marovanyati Dam	Vungu Dam
Lake Gwai Shangani	Kunzvi Dam
Tuli Manyange Dam	Dande Dam
Chivhu Dam	Bindura Dam
Semwa Dam	Silverstroom Dam
Ziminya Dam	Muchekeranwa Dam

The government has since 2018 been engaged in constructing 12 dams of which 3 have been completed around the 10 provinces in Zimbabwe. These dams are set to increase the water capacity by 1.6 billion cubic meters. This is a major investment towards the infrastructure development of Zimbabwe. The contractors for these projects include the China International Water and Electric Corporation Pvt Ltd, Greendale Engineering, EG Construction, and Multi-force Corporation.

Out of the 10 provinces in Zimbabwe, Manicaland provides a useful example of the importance of dam construction due to its topography, history of drought in the area and flooding risks. Buhera district exemplifies this also with its history of being labelled the poorest district prone to drought and has very few resources to its name. According to the Zimpapers, March 2 2023 ([Herald](#)), in February 2023 the government completed the construction of the 50 million cubic meters [Marovanyati dam](#) (one of the biggest in the country) which has so far addressed some of the challenges and has transformed the area positively. Three irrigation schemes were developed as an effort to foster reliable access to irrigation water for communities where the impact of climate change is being strongly felt. The development of irrigation schemes will in turn create employment for the locals.

Besides the infrastructure modernisation drive and attempts at stabilising the currency and rate of exchange, there has been some notable progress in attracting foreign direct investments. The government promised that 'it will be open for business,' and a number of high-level

meetings and exhibitions were held as part of attempts to attract foreign investors. To date, there have been significant foreign direct investment flows into mining. The Table below provides a summary of mining investments made in the past five years.

TABLE 6 New Mining Investments

Mine	Mineral	Location	Year Established
Arcadia Lithium Plant	Lithium	Goromonzi	<u>July 2023</u>
Buhera Sabi-Star Mine	Lithium	Buhera	<u>80% complete</u>
Hwange Lubi Coal Project	Coal	Hwange	<u>May 2023</u>
Dinson Iron and Steel Plant	Iron & Ferro Chrome	Manhize Mvuma	2022
Zimbabwe Zulu Lithium Mine	Lithium	Insiza	<u>April 2023</u>
Kuvimba Mining	Chrome, Gold, Nickel, Lithium, Platinum	Bindura, Kwekwe, Hunters Road, Silobela, Shamva, Chegutu, Mberengwa, Gweru	2020

The efforts mentioned above have made a positive impact on GDP. It is important to note that global GDP growth declined significantly during the years of COVID-19. Zimbabwe was not spared from the scourge of COVID-19. On average the economy has grown by 0.56% since 2018. At the end of 2017, the GDP of the country was US\$ 17.5 billion and by

2022 it had grown to US\$ 20.68 billion. Other Economists (for instance Eddie Cross) argue that the GDP is undervalued due to the exclusion of economic activity in the informal sector. He makes the argument that the informal sector potentially contributes 70% of economic activity, in which instance the GDP of the country would be US\$ 39 billion

GDP in Zimbabwe




FIGURE 3 2017-2022 GDP

Source: World Bank



How Government performed

3. Trade and International Relations



56%

One of the key focus tasks in the Trade and International relations cluster was to ensure successful re-engagement with the international community. It is worth noting that in the period soon after the coup (military-assisted transition), Zimbabwe for a while (November 2017 until July 30, 2018) dominated international headlines for the right reasons; (i) economic reforms, (ii) reassurances to international elections observers (iii) commitment to free and fair elections and (iv) a new commitment to opening the public space. The President even opened a social media account where he posted regularly about the progress they were making as a government and, also interacted with citizens who raised questions as well as those who criticised some of the actions of the government. The government

sought to rebuild international partnerships. Prior to the elections, President Mnangagwa's government submitted an application to rejoin the Commonwealth on the 15th of May 2018.² A clear policy reversal from the Mugabe era. Soon after the elections several MOUs were signed with various countries and entities, for example Zimbabwe signed MOUs with Malawi for its cooperation in the fields of local governance, immigration and gender issues amongst others (Zimpapers, June 3 2023) ([The Chronicle](#)). Moreso, Zimbabwe and Botswana revived the [Joint Commission](#) which had collapsed for many years. The two heads of state agreed on ensuring that the original objectives of the Commission are achieved and made it a Bi-National Commission. Zimbabwe and Rwanda also signed [three bilateral](#)

2. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/5/22/zimbabwe-applies-to-rejoin-commonwealth>

agreements to enhance trade and investments. During Mugabe's time relationships between Harare and Kigali were at best non-existent and the two governments had clashed indirectly during the Congo War of the 1990s. To date, Zimbabwe has established full diplomatic relations with Rwanda (October 2019) and in September 2021 a brand-new building was completed to accommodate the Embassy of Zimbabwe in Kigali.

In 2019, Zimbabwe and the European Union held planned meetings that had not happened in 17 years aimed at ending trade and economic hostility (The Herald). The EU and Zimbabwe round of discussions led to the signing of two financing agreements of 47 million euros in Health and Electoral processes in Harare. The government sought the assistance

of the president of the African Development Bank to help resolve the challenge of re-engagement with international financial institutions. The re-engagement with international creditors led to the participation of both President Mnangagwa and the Minister of Finance (Professor Mthuli Ncube) in the AfDB-organized 2023 Debt Resolution Forum where they engaged with international lenders.

Zimbabwe's ongoing agriculture turnaround (discussed above) is broader than the previous crops discussed. There has been a significant recovery around a number of horticulture value chains. According to the trade promotion body, ZimTrade, in 2021, horticultural exports grew by 6.8%, to the value of US\$64.6 Million inclusive of blueberries.




FIGURE 4 Trends in selected horticulture exports

TABLE 7 Government Performance in Trade and International Relations

sector	promise	# actions	Barometer Score
Trade & International Relations	Access to fairly priced long-term development finance is greatly needed to sustain our development agenda.	1	50%
	Access to lucrative export markets that will help stimulate domestic production capacity.	3	67%
	Engage the Zimbabwean diaspora to contribute towards the social and economic development of the country.	6	56%
	Expedite and bring to finality the resolution of the country's external debt arrears, under the LIMA Plan.	3	57%
	Improved inflows of international investments that will complement local investments.	14	63%
	Mend strained international relations, strengthen existing and create new friendships through re-engagement.	1	57%
	National rebranding and reducing country risk perception.	1	57%
	Normalise the country's relations with the UK, USA, EU, and the white farmers including those who were protected under BIPPAs.	10	59%
	Openness to international election observers.	0	0%
	Protect and preserve the national interest and security.	4	66%
	Re-build local, regional and international partnerships.	41	70%
	Recover lost export markets.	2	50%
	Re-engage international creditors.	6	61%
	Respecting international protocols through their ratification and domestication where necessary.	10	61%
	Strengthen bilateral relationships with China, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia and Brazil as well as countries in our regional trading blocs namely SADC, ECOWAS and COMESA.	21	61%
Total	15	123	56%

How Government performed

4. Governance, Politics and Civil Rights



58%

Under Governance, Politics and Civil Rights, the government scored a 58% completion rate for the 11 promises under the sector. The government took action under all 11 actions and implemented two promises. The first was ensuring the independence, transparency and dependability of the judiciary and the other was setting up a Commission of Inquiry on the 1st of August 2018 violence & make the findings of the same public. The government set up a commission of inquiry on the 1st of August 2018 violence & published the Kgalema Motlante Commission of Enquiry Report in 2018 ([Daily News](#)). One of the major actions undertaken in this sector was to introduce e-passports and in the last year, they have worked to decentralise the process out of Harare by opening

centres in Bulawayo, Murewa District, and Mazowe District.

In May 2023, the cabinet introduced a new digital web-based Court Case Management System (Integrated Electronic Case Management System [IECMS]) as part of the measures to ensure improved access to justice. The IECMS automates and tracks all aspects of a case life cycle, from initial filing through disposition and appeal. It has [7 aspects](#) which are:

- i. Case Management- It has end-to-end management of the case life cycle, from initiation, case tracking and post judgement activities.
- ii. Content Management- provides the capability to electronically store and manage case documents.



- iii. Virtual hearing- hearing held over a secure video link from the courts.
- iv. E payment- e payment of court fees and filing fees
- v. E-service delivery- electronic filing and electronic service of documents
- vi. E calendar- an online calendaring system for lawyers to synchronise their schedules with the judiciary hearing system
- vii. Legal research- The IECMs will be the central repository of legal information such as judgements, statutes, and case law.

The government broke the promise of 'upholding and applying fully the rule of law, while ensuring equality before the law'. In January 2019, the government resorted to the use of force in responding to riots and since then literally [banned public protests](#). The COVID-19 period and related lockdown measures led to an effective shutting down of the public space. Journalists and opposition politicians were routinely arrested. To date, two leading opposition politicians are in prison. Job Sikhala, MP, for Zengeza West (Previously St Marys), has been in prison for more than 365 days on remand awaiting trial. A conviction was issued on 3 May 2023 but there remain 2 active charges against Job Sikhala that he waits for trial in prison.

TABLE 8 Timeline of Job Sikhala's Troubles with the Law

Date	Activity
Jul 2019-2020	In 2019, Sikhala was arrested after declaring while campaigning in Bikita that "we will overthrow Mnangagwa before 2023." He was charged with treason.
14 Feb 2020	Acquitted: Judge described the charges as "bizarre"
14 Jun 2022	Arrested for addressing a crowd at the funeral of Moreblessing Ali. charged with violation of section 187(1)(a) as read with section 36(1)(a) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [hereinafter Criminal Code], being an incitement to commit public violence.
12 Jul 2022	Further charged with obstruction or defeating the course of justice, a violation of section 184(1)(e) of the Criminal Code. The case emanated from a video which Sikhala posted on social media claiming that Moreblessing Ali, a member of the Coalition for Change (CCC) was murdered by ZANU PF supporters.
Jul 2022	Charged with disorderly conduct, a violation of section 41(a) of the Criminal Code.
19 Oct 2022	Appears before Magistrate Court requesting bail and denied for the 6th time.
Nov 2022	Godfrey Sithole who was accused alongside Sikhala was released along with 14 others.
6 Dec 2022	The trial began in the Harare Regional Magistrates Court.
13 Dec 2022	The exception raised by Sikhala's legal team was rejected by the magistrate. Mr Sikhala then pleaded not guilty.
3 Jan 2023	The High Court trial was expected to start but was delayed due to Sikhala's request to broadcast the trial.
4 Jan 2023	High Court trial begins.
Mar 2023	The State offers closing statements.
28 Apr 2023	High Court Judgement was expected but was postponed.
3 May 2023	Convicted of obstruction or defeating the course of justice. convicted the accused to six months imprisonment or payment of a fine of US\$600.00, He was convicted by Magistrate Mrs Marehwanazvo Gofa. In her ruling she said the state was able to prove that Sikhala was the one who authored the video recording which claimed that the late Ali was killed by ZANU PF members.
5 Jun 2023	Denied bail for the 15th time since his arrest.

NB: Arrested 14 June 2022, convicted 3 May 2023 = 323 days

Sikhala will remain in custody, even if he paid the fine, as he awaits trial for two other charges of incitement to commit violence and disorderly conduct.

TEXT BOX 2 **Job Sikhala case overview**

The continued detention of Mr. Sikhala over a period of more than a year raises strong questions around issues of fairness and the cardinal principle of innocent before being proven guilty, fair trial and the freedom of the judiciary from state capture. According to the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.20) 2013, arrested persons must be released unconditionally or on reasonable conditions pending their trial as per section 50(6). The import of this provision is that according to the laws of Zimbabwe, bail is a constitutionally enshrined right. It is thus controversial how on six different sittings, the High Court and the Magistrates Court refused the accused bail.

Additionally, it is a criminal law doctrine that an accused person ought not to be charged with various offenses arising from the same transaction of an offense. This means that in the Sikhala matter, the state ought to have preferred the most fitting charge and proceed in prosecution. This was not done. On the other hand, it is trite law that where an accused person has been detained for too long on remand, the presiding officer can issue an order of refusal of further remand to protect an accused person who has not been convicted. This was also not observed in the Sikhala matter resulting in his detention for over a year.

Conclusively, it is yet to be determined how long Job Sikhala will remain detained. It however remains less probable that state apparatus will speed up the process of his two pending trials due to the political nature of his case and the imminent elections in the country.

Contributed by Ebenezer Nobela (20 July 2023)

TABLE 9 **Government Performance in Governance, Politics and Civil Rights**

sector	subsector	# promises	# actions	Barometer Score
Governance, Politics & Civil Rights	National Healing and Addressing Historical Injustices	3	9	53%
	Governance	8	128	59%
Total		11	137	58%

There are several other cases where the concept of ‘equality before the law’ has been violated. In many instances when opposition-related persons are arrested, they are subjected to some of the most humiliating conditions, like walking in leg irons. They are routinely denied bail at the Magistrate Courts which is the first court of appearance.

However, when ZANU-PF-connected public officials were arrested such as the then Minister of Health, Obadiah Moyo and Gokwe legislator Mayor Wadyadyena (separate cases) they appeared in court in their suits with no leg irons and were quickly granted bail at the Magistrates courts.

How Government performed

5. Local Governance



63%

The passing of the [devolution policy](#) is perhaps one of the most significant measures implemented during the period under review. The policy provides for the following:

- Facilitation for democratic participation of people in making decisions that will affect them through delegating defined central Government powers down to lower tiers and levels of Government, entailing local, political and economic governance powers to designated Provincial and Metropolitan Councils, as well as Rural District and Urban Councils;
- Enhancing citizens' participation in the management of local affairs and development;
- Local Authorities will be

empowered to make decisions which previously required authorisation by officials at Provincial and Ministry Head Offices situated in Harare or regional capitals;

- A mechanism for resource sharing; and
- Enable fiscal capacitation of the lower tiers of Government.

There have been several rounds of disbursements from the central government to local authorities amounting to ZWL 2.2 billion from [2019-2021](#), 1.7 billion and [ZWL 11.8 billion in 2023](#). There are still outstanding challenges in how the Ministry of Finance determines allocations to different local authorities. Some local authorities responded positively by rolling out

projects that involve borehole drilling, sewer reticulation, water treatment plants, purchasing of heavy-duty machinery etc. The two promises in

this sector had a barometer score of 63%, however, all the promises have not been fully implemented.

TABLE 10 Government Performance: Local Governance

Sector	promise	# actions	Barometer Score
Local Governance	Re-alignment of the service provision standards in all areas that include water reticulation, electricity, roads and other support infrastructure.	47	61%
	Zero tolerance for corruption and incompetence in urban councils	19	65%
Total	2	66	63%



How Government performed

6. Youth and Gender



55%

Several projects were proposed, and some were implemented to ensure progress in meeting the 16 promises made in this cluster. The majority of the actions focused on increasing the participation of women in lucrative value chains of key economic sectors. The government set up [women empowerment service centres](#) to ensure the inclusiveness of women in areas of development. A number of youths have been [trained in business](#) as part of actions to ensure that this demographic is adequately equipped. To increase budgetary allocations for youth development, a [youth relief fund](#) was launched by the Minister of Youth in 2020. It was meant for the youth as grants to provide relief support to youth enterprises affected by COVID-19.

Two promises under this cluster have been fully implemented, one

on Increasing women's access to finance. In June 2018, [Women's Bank opened](#) its doors to the public and, according to observers the opening of the Zimbabwe Women Microfinance Bank further consolidates Government's commitment towards ensuring women's participation in the mainstream economy. Another implemented promise is on ensuring youth mainstreaming in all national development programmes. To complement this promise, Zimbabwe's First 'Youth-Focused' Bank was [opened in July 2018](#) with the purpose of providing social and financial solutions to the financially excluded population with a greater focus on the youth.

However, there are some promises that the government has not carried out any actions on. The government did not pursue the promise to ensure



50/50 representation in key decision-making positions in both public and private institutions. The 2018 elections witnessed a decrease in women's representation at the national and

local level and it's most likely that there will be fewer women in both the upper and lower houses after the 2023 harmonised elections.

TABLE 11 Government Performance in Youth and Gender

Sector	subsector	# promises	# actions	Barometer Score
Youth & Gender	Youth	10	30	53%
	Gender Equity	6	20	59%
Total		16	50	55%

How Government performed

7. Social Services



42%

The social services cluster is made up of four sub-clusters which are, (i) pension systems and allocations, (ii) housing, (iii) health, and (iv) education. While the government has taken several actions in these areas, the sector score remains at 42% completion. Out of the four (4) subsectors, Education has the best score (53%) where the government in partnership with the private sector has secured more than ZWL 90 million for loans, meant for students in tertiary institutions and has also developed eight (8) innovation hubs and industrial parks at six (6) state universities. The government has not adequately focused on the housing sector (41%). There has been no movement on the several promises that have been made. Initially, the commitment was to deliver 1.5 million

affordable housing units. In 2020, this promise was reviewed downwards to 100'000 houses per year (this is half a million over the 5 years). The promise was further modified to 220'000 housing units. In March 2023, it was reported that 180'000 housing units have already been built which is 82% of the modified promise (Zimpapers, March 23 2023) (The Herald).

Under the Health subsector, two promises have been broken; (i) the review of the remuneration structure for medical professionals and (ii) ensure that the treasury allocates at least 15% of the national budget to health care (in line with the Abuja declaration). The period under review has been characterised by a number of industrial actions, especially by nurses and doctors going on strike for improved conditions of service. Furthermore,

several nurses have taken advantage of opportunities in the UK to migrate there. The National budget allocations especially for 2022 and 2023 provided 12% and 11% respectively of the budget to health thereby breaking the promise of ensuring that the treasury allocates at least 15% of the national budget to health care in line with the Abuja declaration which the government is signatory to.

In education, the government made progress on nine promises. One of the actions noted under the promise of, providing educational loans to students undertaking tertiary education in partnership with the private sector was securing ZWL 90 million of loans to pay fees. The scheme was run by CBZ Bank with a government guarantee. No work was done to implement one promise which is,

- Promote employer-led training programs by introducing an appropriate recognition and incentive framework for companies to train apprentices.

Under the Pensions System/

Allocation -NSSA subsector 9 promises were made and 7 of those are in progress while no work has started on 2 promises i.e.

- i. Carry out legislative reforms to ensure that any new private and public sector infrastructure development has appropriate facilities to accommodate people with disabilities.
- ii. Committed to upholding the provisions of the National Constitution regarding the welfare of the elderly.

One of the major actions under this sector is the approval of the Compensation Framework for 2009 Insurance Policy Holders and Pension Scheme Members and Supplementary Compensation by the Government towards implementation of the promise of Creating social safety nets.

Table 12 provides the scoring of government performance in responding to social service.

TABLE 12 **Government Performance: Social Services**

Sector	Subsector	# promises	# actions	Barometer Score
Social Services	Pension Systems / Allocations - NSSA	9	57	49%
	Housing	8	60	36%
	Health	15	58	37%
	Education	10	72	47%
Total		42	247	42%

Table 13 provides a more detailed breakdown of government performance against the targets that it had set in the campaign manifesto.

The government failed to meet its targets across all sub-clusters except maybe in the health sector during the COVID-19 period.

TABLE 13 SMART Promises for Social Services

Subsector	Promise	Target	Actual (May 2023)
Education	Invest more in schools' infrastructure development and proper resourcing of schools through the building of 2000 schools by 2023.	2'000 schools	33 new schools registered. 13 schools upgraded
Health	Build 78 new hospitals and establish at least one new hospital per administrative district by 2023.	78 new hospitals	13 new clinics
Health	Ensure the treasury allocates at least 15% of the national budget to health care in line with the Abuja declaration.	15% of the national budget on health	11% spent on health in 2023
Health	Establish a modern, affordable healthcare system for all. Reducing hospital fees by 50%, improving the supply of critical drugs, guaranteeing free health care to all cancer patients	Reduce hospital fees by 50%	Health fees increased between 2018 - 2023
Housing	In collaboration with the private sector, deliver at least 1.5 million affordable housing units to the people in the next 5 years.	1.5 million housing units	180'000

How Government performed

8. Corruption



44%

The ZANU-PF 2018 manifesto identified corruption as an area of concern. They made four (4) promises and have started work on three of them. In the five years under review, the government has taken some actions to combat corruption. The body tasked with addressing corruption, the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) was in the news on a regular basis. Of the four promises made towards eradicating corruption, none has been fully implemented, while no action has been made towards one of the four promises, which is on ensuring non-interference by the Executive in the operations of Constitutional institutions combating corruption. To date, the government has set up anti-Corruption courts across all ten provinces, including the commissioning of virtual

courts. The government also invested in training the judiciary on judging corruption cases. The Anti-corruption body advocated for amendment of the laws governing corruption and worked on anti-corruption campaigns across all 10 provinces.

Several arrests and convictions have been made for instance the Zimbabwe National Road Administration (ZINARA) Chief Executive Officer Saston Muzenda was sentenced to 36 months in jail after being convicted of criminal abuse of office and ZACC Commissioner Frank Muchemwa was also fired with immediate effect after allegations of illegal behaviour were filed against him. The arrests of former cabinet ministers Prisca Mupfumira and Obadiah Moyo (separate dates and charges) and that of Gokwe-Nembudziya legislator Mayor

Wadyajena led to the impression of a government focused on eradicating corruption but their cases are still pending before courts. Others arrested for allegations of corruption include the Harare City Council finance director Tendai Kwenda, an NSSA accountant, a National Railways of Zimbabwe engineer, the director of the Local Government ministry and a former deputy Minister of Agriculture Douglas Karoro. Beyond arrests and

jail terms, other individuals were also either suspended or totally dismissed from office after corruption scandals, like the [former Minister of Health and Child Welfare](#), have been fired on allegations of corruption, and others were suspended from their official positions. The Table below provides the scoring of government performance in response to corruption.

TABLE 14 Government Performance: Eradication of Corruption

Sector	Promise	# actions	Barometer Score
Corruption	Ensure a corruption-free environment in both the private and public sectors.	35	60%
	Ensure non-interference by the Executive in the operations of Constitutional institutions combating corruption.	0	0%
	Initiate a broad-based campaign on the need to uphold sound ethical standards across all sectors.	2	57%
	Swift justice will be served on perpetrators of crime and other acts of economic sabotage.	57	59%
Total	4	94	44%

5 Conclusion

Despite what may seem an impressive performance on the part of the government, very little has changed on the ground. Unemployment remains a huge challenge. According to the recent census data 2.5 million persons were currently employed, which is 27.7% of the national working-age population (~9 mil) (ZimStat, 2022 Appendix V). Some of the top employment industries are agriculture, forestry and fishing (24%), wholesale and retail trade; sale and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles (17.2%), manufacturing (10.7%) and mining and quarrying (9.1%). However, for those employed many are still excluded from the formal employment sector. The 2022 Second Quarter Quarterly Labour Force Survey found that of those who were employed, 29% of them were part of the formal sector while 45% of them were employed in the informal sector. The same 2022 survey found that 20% of persons 15 years and above were

unemployed. Our citizens' perceptions and expectations surveys carried out annually since 2018 have found that the creation of employment is one of their top priority areas ([see Jowah 2023](#)).

Other studies, the [Zimbabwe Poverty Assessment Report](#) and the [World Bank's Economic and Social Update Report](#) have also shown that incidences of poverty are increasing. The challenge could be to do with a lack of alignment between what the government does and citizens' expectations. For instance, there is no evidence that the good story around infrastructure is widely supported. According to the [Citizens Perceptions and Expectations survey](#), infrastructure development is not one of the top priorities of citizens. Over the 5 years, infrastructure has been ranked on average 7th on the list of priorities for citizens across the country during previous CPE surveys. Besides jobs, we learnt that citizens tend to prioritise issues

such as improved access to health, education and stable prices of goods.

Despite the overwhelming evidence of government-led spending in infrastructure modernisation, increased investments in mining and revamping local production in manufacturing and agriculture livelihoods remain largely precarious. Perhaps there is something that is wrong with the model? The big projects approach preferred by the government has been implemented in the context of low wages within the government and in the private sector. The majority in formal and informal sector employment do not have disposable income for long-term savings. On the other hand, the beneficiaries (contracted companies) of the big projects approach are very few. The income redistribution model does not meet best practice standards. It is based on the supposed efficacy of trickle-down thinking. The results to date point towards the emergence of a new elite made up of politically connected businesses that have a monopoly on government contracts without necessarily going to competitive tender.

The mining-related investments potentially suggest that international finance capital is slowly warming up to Zimbabwe. Prior to President Mnangagwa's ascension to power, the government had been pushing a localisation agenda through indigenisation (at least 51% local ownership) and local beneficiation. President Mugabe had at some point even banned exports of raw chromium

and ordered platinum miners to invest in refining capacities. The second republic removed all these conditions for mining and literally joined the rest of African countries in what is commonly referred to as the 'race to the bottom'³. Even though the government has committed itself to developing a mining industry worth US\$ 12 billion they have not been clear about what will be the share of government revenue. The new lithium rush is a golden opportunity to position Zimbabwe as one of the global producers of lithium batteries or at the very least some elements of the batteries. Most of the lithium mining licenses have been awarded to foreign investors (see Table 6).

The salaries story and investment patterns in mining reveal a preoccupation with a market-driven and foreign investor economic turnaround. The logic is to reduce the government's recurrent expenditure, an issue that has been repeatedly raised by Washington Consensus institutions, and to attract foreign investors, especially in high-capital projects such as mining. On the other hand, the infrastructure has largely benefitted local companies. The model does not contribute to equitable development. At the very least it may create a new Zimbabwe's black capitalist class but beholden to ZANU-PF. There has been no progress on ensuring constitutionally enshrined political and civil rights. To date the manner in which development is being carried out, thrust is limited, it does not show the possibility of inclusivity.

3. The race to the bottom refers to a competitive situation where a company, state, or nation attempts to undercut the competition's prices by sacrificing quality standards or worker safety (often defying regulation), or reducing labour costs.

Lessons Learnt- Six Take-aways

Manifestos are Essential but they need Refining

1

Perhaps one of the biggest take-aways from five years of tracking government performance is that some manifestos may not necessarily be fit for purpose. The governing party has made significant progress in terms of following up on promises made but that has not led to wide-spread change. We acknowledge that the Zimbabwean crisis was by 2018 decades old and nothing short of a miracle would have led to a complete turnaround within five years. However, a manifesto-based approach to political campaigning potentially provides for a framework of consultation and accountability between those seeking public office and the electorate. If executed well the manifesto-driven approach must provide for possibilities of aligning with the electorates through a number of innovations of cocreation and codesign. It may nurture bottom-up approaches. At the moment we do not know how manifestos are written. They are just publicly launched, and the electorate is expected to embrace them and vote.

Political Will to Execute the War on Corruption

2

However, there is a lot that could have been done as well. The government could have tightened its procurement procedures as part of measures to contain possible corruption. Despite the rhetoric against corruption, the allegations of corruption have increased. As early as 2019 there was a scandal around procurement of grain from Tanzania at inflated prices. During COVID-19 there were allegations to do with procurement of COVID-19-related consumables. There was a scandal around the Pomona scandal. Perhaps the gold mafia expose served to reveal what ordinary citizens have already observed. In our Citizens Perceptions Expectations surveys, respondents have consistently ranked corruption as the number one factor inhibiting government performance. However, it is the optics around how those accused of corruption are treated. In many instances, they are quickly given bail and their cases are rarely brought back to court.

The Need for Long-Term Policy Consistency

3

The government has made some radical policy shifts contradicting the path of the previous regime. For instance, the commitment to pay US\$ 3.5 billion to

former large-scale commercial farmers as compensation for improvements on farms has divided Zimbabweans and even ZANU-(PF). Other political formations that had supported radical land reform such as the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) criticised the government of Zimbabwe. For many, the commitment to pay US\$3.5 billion was seen as a very expensive capitulation to the demands of international capital that had one of the signature re-engagements. To date, government has done away with indigenisation (local ownership) in mining and removed conditions for mineral beneficiation. Perhaps these measures explain the increase in the number of mining-related investments. It will be important to review the performance of this policy change in terms of local revenues and the extent to which the mining sector connects with the broader economy. For the record, mining is a very profitable venture and emerging global best practice insists that these companies must re-invest in local economics. There is an urgent need for a local content policy.

An Alternative Infrastructure Modernisation Framework

4

As already noted, the government has made remarkable progress in modernising infrastructure. However, the progress made has not led to improved incomes or livelihoods. A few companies have made a fortune to the extent that one of these has even bought the third largest cementing manufacturing plants in the country. The government could have considered setting up youth building brigades and made it compulsory for these companies to ensure some of the work (at least 20%) is subcontracted to these youth brigades and local communities where infrastructure development is taking place. Furthermore, the government could have worked with local authorities to create incentives for communities that are prepared to work together with the local authorities to revamp infrastructure.

Old habits die hard

5

Despite repeated claims to be new or 'the second republic' some of the old behaviours have remained the same. The culture of impunity continues. Political rivals are still unfairly treated and arrested on charges that are repeatedly thrown out in the High Court. There seems to be a consensus that the Magistrate courts should never award bail to opposition politicians. On the other hand, the same courts are quick to award bail to those who are aligned with the ruling party even when the allegations seem serious.

Sanctions create a policy autonomy opportunity

6

Development scholars have repeatedly argued that donor-receiving countries no longer have the autonomy to design and implement policies of their choice. Governments have surrendered their policymaking and planning obligations to multilateral institutions such as the IMF and World Bank and donor countries. The government of Zimbabwe has repeatedly made calls for the lifting of ZIDERA and related measures. In some instances, ruling party-aligned politicians have identified these measures as inhibiting/limiting possibilities of attracting foreign direct investment and aid. They have used sanctions as the main cause of underdevelopment. All this is partly true. However, government actors may not realize that the isolation is an opportunity for policy autonomy. We (SIVIO Institute) have had the opportunity to carry out similar tracking work (conversion of campaign promises into policy actions) in Malawi and Zambia. Conversion of promises into policy actions has been remarkably slow in both Malawi and Zambia. One possible explanation for this is that the two countries receive a significant part of their budget through Direct Budget Support. In many instances, donors participating in DBS are actively involved in determining how resources are utilized thereby exerting their influence and priorities on policy programs.

Zimbabwe's path has been different. It has received support from China to carry out infrastructure development projects but has largely been shunned by global North donor countries for a variety of reasons including outstanding debts. In the meantime, that isolation has literally led to some level of policy autonomy. However, the autonomy is qualified. The IMF has since 2018 put Zimbabwe under the Staff Monitored Program where they do not provide financial support but provide technical support for countries to align with global best practice. There have been moments of disagreement between Harare and the IMF team. For instance, the IMF did not endorse the gold coin initiative, but the government still went ahead and implemented it. However, compared with her counterparts Zimbabwe has had some space to manoeuvre and carry out significant infrastructure projects which will potentially be of benefit to the country in the long run. Furthermore, the government has continued to fund agricultural production through a variety of instruments and these interventions have contributed to both the wheat and maize production booms in the past three years.

6 References

- Aljazeera News Agencies. (2018, May 22). Zimbabwe applies to rejoin Commonwealth. *Aljazeera*. Retrieved July 25, 2023, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/5/22/zimbabwe-applies-to-rejoin-commonwealth>.
- Cision PR Newswire. (2019, October 16). Zimbabwe moves to implement Motlanthe Commission recommendations on 2018 post-election violence Retrieved July 25, 2023, from <https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/zimbabwe-moves-to-implement-motlanthe-commission-recommendations-on-2018-post-election-violence-300938797.html>.
- ILO. (2019, May 27). *Zimbabwe Reaffirms its Commitment to Eradicate Modern Slavery*. 50forFreedom. Retrieved July 25, 2023, from <https://50forfreedom.org/blog/news/zimbabwe-reaffirms-its-commitment-to-eradicate-modern-slavery/>.
- Jowah, E. (2023). (publication). *Citizens' Perceptions and Expectations: 2023 Survey findings* report. Retrieved July 25, 2023, from https://backend.sivioinstitute.org/uploads/2023_Citizens_Perceptions_and_Expectations_b9fa69f13a.pdf.
- Laiton, C. (2019, February 20). Army, cops ordered out of courts. *Newsday*. Retrieved July 25, 2023, from <https://www.newsday.co.zw/2019/02/army-cops-ordered-out-of-courts>.
- M. J. (2018, July 30). What is at stake in Zimbabwe's election? *The Economist*. Retrieved July 25, 2023, from <https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/07/30/what-is-at-stake-in-zimbabwes-election> .
- Machivenyika, F. (2019, June 6). Zim, EU in historic talks. *The Herald*. Retrieved July 25, 2023, from <https://www.herald.co.zw/zim-eu-in-historic-talks/>.
- Madzimore, J. (2020, January 18). \$100million loan facility for students. *The Herald*. Retrieved July 25, 2023, from <https://www.herald.co.zw/100m-loan-facility-for-students/>.
- Moore, D. (2003). Zimbabwe's triple crisis: Primitive accumulation, nation-state formation and democratization in the age of neo-liberal globalization. *African Studies Quarterly*. 7. 10.1002/9780470758540.ch1.
- Murisa, T. (2022). (rep.). *Contested Claims of Progress: An Analysis of Government Performance 2018 - 2021*. Harare: SIVIO Institute.
- Murisa, T., Kushata, J. N. T., & Rwapunga T. (2020). (rep.). *Dancing on the Same Spot: Citizens' Perceptions and Expectations*. Harare, Zimbabwe: SIVIO Institute.

Nobela, E. (2023, July). (Memo) *Job Sikhala Criminal Charges*. Submitted to SIVIO Institute 20 July 2023.

The World Bank Group. (2021, June). *Overcoming-Economic-Challenges-Natural-Disasters-and-the-Pandemic-Social-and-Economic-Impacts*. <https://www.worldbank.org/curated/en/563161623257944434/pdf/Overcoming-Economic-Challenges-Natural-Disasters-and-the-Pandemic-Social-and-Economic-Impacts.pdf>.

The World Bank. (2022, October 24). Reversing the tide: Reducing poverty and boosting resilience in Zimbabwe. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2022/10/24/reversing-the-tide-reducing-poverty-and-boosting-resilience-in-zimbabwe>.

Tshuma, M. (2020, May 1). \$17 million relief fund for youth businesses. *The Chronicle*. Retrieved July 25, 2023, from <https://www.chronicle.co.zw/17-million-relief-fund-for-youth-businesses/>.

Veritas. (2023, 2 May). Twelfth Cabinet Press Briefing. Harare. Retrieved July 25, 2023.

Veritas. (2023, April 11). Ninth Post-Cabinet Press Briefing. Harare. Retrieved July 25, 2023, Women's Bank Opens.

Zabasajja, J., & Ndlovu, R. (2023, April 23). Zimbabwe rules out ditching local currency as dollar use soars. *Bloomberg*. Retrieved July 25, 2023, from <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-22/zimbabwe-dollar-to-stay-finance-minister-ncube-says#xj4y7vzkg>.

Zimbabwe Women's Microfinance Bank. (2018, June 14). Women's Bank Opens. Retrieved July 25, 2023, from <https://www.womensbank.co.zw/2018/06/14/womens-bank-opens/>.

Zimpapers. (2023, June 14). Tobacco delivers hit record levels. *The Herald*. Retrieved July 25, 2023, from <https://www.herald.co.zw/tobacco-deliveries-hit-record-levels/>.

Zimpapers. (2022, November 1). Tobacco sales hit US\$650 million. *The Sunday News*. Retrieved July 25, 2023, from <https://www.sundaynews.co.zw/tobacco-sales-hit-us650-million/>.

Zimpapers. (2023, June 3). Zimbabwe, Malawi longstanding relations boosted. *The Chronicle*. Retrieved July 25, 2023, from <https://www.chronicle.co.zw/comment-zimbabwe-malawi-longstanding-relations-boosted/>.

Zimpapers. (2023, March 2). Second republic delivers: Marovanyati dam profile. *The Herald*. Retrieved July 25, 2023, from <https://www.herald.co.zw/second-republic-delivers-marovanyati-dam-profile/>.

Zimpapers. (2023, March 23). Modern affordable housing drive on target. *The Herald*. Retrieved July 25, 2023, from www.herald.co.zw/modern-affordable-housing-drive-on-target/.

ZimStat. (2022). Zimbabwe 2022 Population and Housing Census Report Volume 1.



SIVIO Institute (SI) is an independent organisation focused on ensuring that citizens are at the centre of processes of socio-economic and policy change. It aims to contribute towards Africa's inclusive socio-economic transformation. It is borne out of a desire to enhance agency as a stimulus/catalyst for inclusive political and socio-economic transformation. SIVIO's work entails multi-disciplinary, cutting edge policy research, nurturing citizens' agency to be part of the change that they want to see and working with communities to mobilize their assets to resolve some of the immediate problems they face.

SIVIO Institute has three centres/programs of work focused on; (i) civic engagement (ii) philanthropy and communities (ii) entrepreneurship and financial inclusion. In the process SI addresses the following problems:

- » Inadequate performance of existing political and economic system
- » Increasing poverty and inequality
- » Limited coherence of policies across sectors
- » Ineffectual participation in public processes by non-state actors
- » Increased dependence on external resources and limited leveraging of local resources

sivioinstitute.org